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__________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 In this case we must decide whether the policy of 
Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare requiring intent to 
establish domicile discriminates under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988), against a 
profoundly retarded individual on the basis of his handicap.  The 
district court found the policy discriminatory and required the 
Department of Public Welfare to fund retardation services for the 
plaintiff Nikitas Juvelis.  We will affirm.  
I. 
 Nikitas Juvelis (Niki) is a profoundly retarded and 
physically handicapped 33 year old citizen of the United States.0 
Although Niki's parents are also United States citizens, they 
have lived in Venezuela since Niki's birth.  When Niki was 
fifteen, his parents placed him, at their expense, in the Melmark 
Home, a residential home for the handicapped in Delaware County, 
Pennsylvania.  He has lived there continuously for the past 
eighteen years.  Prior to Niki's placement in Melmark, his 
parents had no connection to Pennsylvania.  In recent years, 
Melmark's costs have gone up sharply, while Niki's parents have 
gotten older and their income has declined.  The Juvelises 
                     
0The American Association for Mental Deficiencies defines 
profoundly retarded individuals as those with I.Q. scores below 
20.  Niki additionally has cerebral palsy and clubbed feet and is 
confined to a wheelchair. 
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anticipate that soon they will be unable to afford Niki's fees at 
Melmark.0 
 Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare (DPW) 
provides benefits to retarded persons, which can include payment 
for placements in facilities like Melmark.  The Juvelises applied 
for such coverage for Niki.  DPW policy gives the counties 
primary responsibility for determining eligibility for mental 
retardation services.  But the counties may not expend state 
funds to provide services for a person who is not a state 
resident.  Niki was turned down for coverage because, for funding 
purposes, he was not considered a bona fide resident0 of Delaware 
County or of Pennsylvania.  This residency determination was made 
on the basis of DPW policy, but that policy is nowhere codified 
as a rule or regulation.  
 Generally, the policy on residency requires the county 
to determine the domicile of the individual prior to placement. 
In this case, because Niki was a minor before placement, he was a 
resident of his parents' domicile, Venezuela.  When an individual 
reaches majority, DPW presumes he retains his parents' domicile 
                     
0When Niki first arrived at Melmark, the cost of tuition was 
$11,000 per year.  Currently, Melmark's tuition is $60,000.  Over 
the past eighteen years, the Juvelises have paid several hundred 
thousand dollars to Melmark. 
0A bona fide resident is one who is legally domiciled in 
Pennsylvania.  See discussion infra, part V.  We recognize the 
distinction between domicile and residence.  See, e.g., 13B 
Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3612 
(2d ed. 1984) ("[T]he domicile of a person is the place where he 
has his true, fixed home and principal establishment, and to 
which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. 
Domicile . . . is more than an individual's residence, although 
the two typically coincide.").  In this opinion, when we say 
residence, we are referring to bona fide residence or domicile. 
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unless and until he establishes a new one.  Proof of change of 
domicile has two components:  physical presence plus an intent to 
remain.  Niki has physical presence in Delaware County, 
Pennsylvania.  What he lacks is the mental capacity to form an 
intent to remain.  The crux of this case is whether a residency 
requirement that depends on mental capacity is discriminatory in 
a way that violates § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  To answer 
this question, we must determine whether residency is essential 
to DPW's program and whether Niki can satisfy the residency 
requirement under a reasonable modification to DPW's policy. 
Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1994).  "The test to 
determine the reasonableness of a modification is whether it 
alters the essential nature of the program or imposes an undue 
burden or hardship in light of the overall program."  Id. at 305. 
Accordingly, DPW must show that it cannot employ an exception to 
its residency policy that would accommodate profoundly retarded 
persons without incurring an undue burden or modifying the 
essential nature of its program.   
II. 
 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: 
"No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of 
her or his disability be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance . . . ." 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).  As a recipient of 
federal financial assistance, DPW is subject to the requirements 
of § 504.  DPW maintains that Niki is not "otherwise qualified" 
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for inclusion in Pennsylvania's mental retardation program 
because he is not a Pennsylvania resident.  The Juvelises contend 
that Pennsylvania's policy for determining residency makes Niki's 
exclusion "solely by reason of" his retardation.  DPW counters 
that it cannot modify implementation of its residency requirement 
in a way that would accommodate Niki's handicap without making 
fundamental changes to its program that would impose an undue 
burden on the Commonwealth. 
III. 
 The Juvelises sued the Secretary of DPW alleging the 
policy violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, his 
constitutional right to travel, and his constitutional rights to 
procedural and substantive due process.  Because there was no 
dispute as to any material fact, the district court referred the 
cross motions for summary judgment to the magistrate judge.  
 The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 
that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be granted on the 
ground that DPW policy violated the Rehabilitation Act.0  Both 
parties filed objections.  The district court approved the 
magistrate judge's finding that DPW's policy violated § 504, and, 
without setting a timetable, ordered DPW to develop and implement 
a mechanism that would allow the Commonwealth to apply its 
residency requirement in a manner that does not discriminate 
                     
0She also recommended denying defendant's motion for summary 
judgment.  Having disposed of the case on statutory grounds, the 
magistrate judge did not reach the constitutional issues. 
6 
against retarded persons.  Meanwhile, the court enjoined DPW from 
denying Niki benefits.   
 The Juvelises filed a motion for reconsideration, 
objecting that the court had failed to provide the parties an 
opportunity to be heard on the relief.  The district court 
granted the motion for reconsideration, vacated its prior order, 
and ordered instead (1) approval and adoption of the magistrate 
judge's report and recommendation, (2) denial of DPW's motion for 
summary judgment, (3) grant of the Juvelises' motion for summary 
judgment, and (4) a declaration that DPW's residency policy 
violates § 504 and that Niki is eligible for mental retardation 
services. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction of 
these federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction of a final decision of the district court.  28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).  In reviewing dispositions on summary 
judgment, we apply the same test the district court should have 
used.  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). 
IV. 
 This case presents the narrow question whether DPW can 
employ an exception to its residency policy that would 
accommodate a profoundly retarded person without incurring an 
undue burden or modifying the essential nature of the program. We 
believe it can. 
A. 
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 DPW maintains Niki neither is an "otherwise qualified" 
person, nor has been discriminated against because of his 
handicap.  "An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to 
meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 
(1979).  DPW contends Niki is not "otherwise qualified" because 
he lacks the capacity to form the intent to establish Delaware 
County or Pennsylvania as his residence.  But "an individual may 
be otherwise qualified in some instances even though he cannot 
meet all of a program's requirements."  Wagner v. Fair Acres 
Geriatric Center, 49 F.3d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1995).  "The 
benefit . . . cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies 
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access 
to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, 
reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may 
have to be made."  Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985). 
Furthermore, we have recognized that § 504 requires some 
affirmative steps to accommodate handicapped persons.  Nathanson 
v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 
1991).  The burden is on the recipient of federal funds "to show 
that the required modification entails a substantial alteration 
in order to avoid a violation of the Act."  Id.  "[I]f there is 
no factual basis in the record demonstrating that accommodating 
the individual would require a fundamental modification or an 
undue burden, then the handicapped person is otherwise qualified 
and refusal to waive the requirement is discriminatory."  Easley 
v. Snider, 36 F.3d at 302.  See also Wagner, 49 F.3d at 1016-17 
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(summary judgment reversed because center failed to offer any 
factual basis demonstrating that admission of plaintiff would 
have changed the essential nature of the facility or imposed an 
undue burden). 
 DPW concedes that but for his inability to meet the 
residency test, Niki is qualified for participation in the 
program providing retardation services.  Accordingly, DPW must 
demonstrate that accommodating Niki would require a fundamental 
modification of its program or impose an undue burden.  This DPW 
has failed to do.0 
B. 
 DPW contends that accommodating Niki would 
impermissibly require modification of the essential nature of its 
program and impose an undue burden.  "The first step in resolving 
this dispute must be to ascertain the essential nature of the . . 
. program."  Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 
(3d Cir. 1983).  The essential nature of the program is to 
provide mental retardation services for Pennsylvania residents.0 
Thus, DPW maintains, and we agree, that residency is fundamental 
                     
0DPW misperceives the burden of proof on this issue.  In its 
brief, DPW states, "[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate 
that Mr. Juvelis's proposed accommodation would be an easily 
administered test."  The burden, however, does not lie on Niki to 
show the accommodation could be easily administered.  Rather, the 
burden is on DPW to demonstrate that adjusting its requirements 
would fundamentally alter the program or impose an undue burden 
on the department. 
0Pennsylvania's Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 
as amended, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & 
1994 Supp.), set up a comprehensive system providing various 
mental retardation services for Pennsylvania residents, including 
day programs, family support services, and residential 
placements. 
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to this state funded system and Pennsylvania domicile is part of 
the essential nature of its program.  See, e.g. Martinez v. 
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 327 (1983) (states have a legitimate 
interest in assuring that services provided to its residents are 
only used by its residents).  But the Juvelises have not asked 
for elimination of the residency requirement altogether.  All 
they are seeking is an exception from the intent component of the 
residency test for their profoundly handicapped child.  DPW has 
not demonstrated that provision of mental health services for 
Niki, who has resided in Pennsylvania for eighteen years, will 
interfere with the essential nature of its program. 
 DPW also contends intent is an essential element of 
domicile (which presumably makes it essential to its program). 
But under its present policy, DPW already makes an exception from 
the traditional intent requirement for residency, applying a 
presumption that an incompetent individual must intend to adopt 
the domicile of his parents as of the time he turned eighteen.  
Although the purpose of this policy is to provide benefits only 
to individuals whose parents are domiciled in Pennsylvania, the 
exception discriminates against profoundly retarded individuals 
like Niki, whose parents live elsewhere, but who are themselves 
long term residents of the Commonwealth.  DPW has not 
demonstrated that another exception to the intent component would 
compromise the essential nature of its program or be unduly 
burdensome. 
V. 
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 The Juvelises argue for an exception to DPW's policy, 
contending that Niki should be permitted to rebut the presumption 
that he retains his parents' domicile and prove that he has 
established legal residency in Pennsylvania.  In order to analyze 
the impact of such an exception on the essential nature of the 
program and whether it would constitute an undue burden, we will 
examine the traditional ways of proving intent to change 
domicile.   
A. 
 "Although the meaning may vary according to context, 
`residence' generally requires both physical presence and an 
intention to remain."  Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. at 330.  "In 
general, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and 
permanent home and place of habitation.  It is the place to 
which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning." 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973) (citing, as 
reasonable, an official opinion of Connecticut's Attorney 
General).  "Domicile, therefore, has both a physical and a mental 
dimension . . . ."  13B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 3612 (2d ed. 1984).  Although physical 
presence yields easily to objective analysis, divining intent can 
be elusive.   
 Persuasive evidence of intent can include establishment 
of a home, Walls v. Ahmed, 832 F. Supp. 940, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1993), 
place of employment, location of assets, and registration of car, 
Matter of Estate of Phillips, 604 P.2d 747, 754 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1980), and, generally, centering one's business, domestic, 
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social, and civic life in a jurisdiction, Walls v. Ahmed, 832 F. 
Supp. at 943; Reiersen v. Commissioner of Revenue, 524 N.E.2d 
857, 858 (Mass. App.Ct. ), rev. denied, 526 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 
1988).  Motive is not determinative, although it may be important 
evidence tending to show whether or not there was an intention to 
make a home.  Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 22 (1934); see 
also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. at 332-33 (motive betrayed lack 
of intent to change permanent home); Mansfield Township Board of 
Ed. v. State Board of Ed., 129 A. 765, 766 (N.J. Super. 1925) 
(child who is brought into state by parent or guardian who is 
nonresident for purpose of receiving education in public schools 
of state is not a resident).   
B. 
 Although the principle that an incompetent person 
presumptively lacks the capacity to change domicile is well 
grounded in common law, the rule is not immutable.  Rishell v. 
Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Med. Ctr., 12 F.3d 171, 173 
(10th Cir. 1993).  Accordingly, in many instances courts have 
recognized a change of domicile for an incompetent person.  The 
burden of proof, however, lies on the person seeking to establish 
a change of domicile.  
 Courts have permitted incompetents to effect changes of 
domicile when they have demonstrated subjective attachment to a 
new home and when objective factors support the conclusion that 
the change would protect the best interests of the individual. 
Thus: 
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 The actual mental capacity required for 
selection of a domicil[e] of choice has been 
held to be much less than that required 
generally for the management of an 
individual's affairs, so that ability merely 
to have and express a preference with respect 
to the location of his home has been held 
sufficient to enable an incompetent to select 
his domicil[e]. 
Estate of Freeman v. Department of Revenue, 1989 WL 23045, at *3 
(Or. Tax 1989) (quoting 96 A.L.R. 2d 1236, 1241 (1964)). "Whether 
an incompetent may change his domicile depends on the extent to 
which his reason is impaired.  A comparatively slight degree of 
understanding is required.  It is sufficient if he understands 
the nature and effect of his act."  Coopedge v. Clinton, 72 F.2d 
531, 533 (10th Cir. 1934) (footnote omitted). "It is in every 
case a question of fact whether a person who is mentally 
deficient or of unsound mind is able to choose a home." 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 40 cmt. a (1934).  "The crucial 
question is whether the person has sufficient mental capacity to 
choose a home.  That he may be incapable of managing his own 
affairs is not conclusive; nor is the fact that he has been 
adjudged incompetent and a guardian appointed over his person or 
property."  Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 23 cmt. a 
(1971).  "It has been recognized that, while a person may not be 
capable of doing some acts, . . . yet he may have a sufficient 
degree of understanding to change his domicile."  In re Estate of 
Phillips v. Ververs, 75 Cal. Rptr. 301, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) 
(quoting Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (4th ed. Scoles) at 60)).  
 The principle that an incompetent lacks capacity to 
change domicile "rests upon the notion the incompetent person's 
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right to declare domicile must be suspended until reason returns 
to avoid legal consequences that may later harm the person's best 
interest."  Rishell, 12 F.3d at 173 (citing 13B Wright et al., 
supra, § 3616).  "As corollary to the general principle," 
however, the Tenth Circuit has concluded, "when an incompetent 
person will never regain reason, preserving the person's right to 
determine domicile in the future is but a fiction."  Id. 
Furthermore, "[u]nder New York law, a guardian may change the 
domicile of an incompetent . . . if done in good faith and in the 
best interest of the conservatee."  Love v. Roosevelt Hospital, 
1993 WL 190345, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Gibbs v. Berger, 
399 N.Y.S.2d 304, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) which relied on 
objective criteria including length of relationship to New York, 
probability that incompetent would live out her life in New York, 
and abandonment of former residence).  In Elliot v. Krear, 466 F. 
Supp. 444 (E.D. Va. 1979), the minor plaintiff's divorced mother, 
who had legal custody of him, was domiciled in California.  But 
the court held that the minor was domiciled in Virginia, where he 
was born, had spent all but one year of his life, and where his 
mother had left him in the actual custody of his grandparents. 
Id. at 447. 
 In Dunlap v. Buchanan, 741 F.2d 165, 168 (8th Cir. 
1984) the court recognized the issue to be "a factual question of 
where, considering the mosaic of circumstances surrounding [an 
incompetent's] care and control, he is domiciled."  And in In re 
Teeter v. California, 141 Cal. Rptr. 103, 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1977), the court observed that a mentally disturbed patient's 
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intent is often "unascertainable, and therefore it becomes 
necessary to use objective factors to determine residence." 
(citing 2 B.E. Witkin, California Procedure (Actions) §§ 445-7, 
at 1273 et seq. (2d ed. 1970)).  
C. 
 Because only a minimal degree of mental capacity is 
required to establish a change of domicile, a number of courts 
have dispensed with reliance on an incompetent individual's 
articulation of intent in favor of an analysis that relies on "a 
mosaic of circumstances."  Relevant circumstances include the 
opinions of parents or guardians who are acting in good faith and 
in the best interest of the individual, as well as objective 
factors demonstrating the quality of the individual's attachment 
to his proposed domicile.  The individual's motive in seeking to 
establish a new domicile, the duration of his relationship to the 
locale, abandonment of a prior residence, and the location of 
assets and friends have all been recognized as demonstrating 
attachment to the proposed domicile. 
VI. 
 Plaintiffs have proposed that DPW should follow those 
states that, in other contexts, consider the "mosaic of 
circumstances" surrounding an incompetent individual's assertion 
of domicile and adopt a "substantial contacts" test for 
residency.  To satisfy the requirements of the Rehabilitation 
Act, DPW must show that adoption of such a test would interfere 
with the essential nature of its program or be unduly burdensome. 
We believe that the consideration of relevant circumstances in 
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evaluating an incompetent individual's legal assertion of 
domicile will neither alter the essential nature of the program 
nor be unduly burdensome.   
A. 
 To establish a change of domicile under a "substantial 
contacts" test, the individual, or those acting in his behalf, 
must be able to demonstrate good faith.  Ordinarily, competent 
individuals may establish a change of domicile by demonstrating a 
sincere or good faith intention to remain in the new location, 
and the absence of any intent to go elsewhere.  For a competent 
individual, it makes no difference whether his motive is good or 
bad.  Motive becomes relevant to the good faith inquiry only when 
one's purpose in moving to the new location betrays a lack of 
intention to remain.  Here, however, the good faith of those 
seeking to establish that an incompetent individual has changed 
his domicile assumes an added significance.  Under the 
Rehabilitation Act, it may interfere with the essential purpose 
of the program for DPW to recognize a change of domicile for 
individuals whose only motive in moving is to obtain state funded 
services.  Accordingly, under the Rehabilitation Act, the good 
faith of those seeking to establish a change of domicile for an 
incompetent individual seeking state funded services may be 
tested by examining the motive behind the change of residence.   
 Objective factors that will be probative of good faith 
will include the length and likely duration of the individual's 
residence, his financial or other connections to the locale, and 
the quality of his contacts with other locations.  In other 
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contexts, there is no minimum period of residence required for 
establishing a new domicile.  But where we are examining the 
motive of those seeking to establish a change of domicile for the 
purpose of receiving state-funded services under the 
Rehabilitation Act, duration of residence will be of particular 
significance.  Also relevant, although not dispositive, is the 
individual's subjective attachment to his home.  We recognize 
that incompetent individuals will have varying abilities to 
express their subjective preferences and the weight attributable 
to this factor will vary accordingly.  Because this inquiry is 
directed at discovering the extent of the individual's attachment 
to Pennsylvania, a residency determination made on the basis of 
these factors will not alter the essential nature of the program. 
 The opinions of parents or guardians who are acting in 
the incompetent individual's best interest also will be 
probative.  We note that this last factor is different from the 
kind of surrogacy we rejected in Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297 
(3d Cir. 1994).  In Easley, mental alertness was part of the 
essential nature of a program designed "to allow the physically 
disabled to live in the least restrictive environment as 
independently as possible."  Id. at 302.  Accordingly, we held: 
[The use of surrogates] would shift [the 
focus of the program] from the provision of 
attendant care and its societal objectives 
for the physically disabled to personal care 
services to the many thousands of physically 
disabled who are often served by other 
specially designed state programs.  The 
proposed alteration would create a program 
that the State never envisioned when it 
enacted the Care Act. 
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Id. at 305.  But here, mental capacity to choose domicile is not 
a criterion fundamental to participation in the program.  A 
parent or guardian's interpretation of the individual's wishes 
will not disrupt the objectives of the program.   
B. 
 DPW also objects that administration of a substantial 
contacts test would be unduly burdensome.  "Accommodations that 
are `reasonable' must not unduly strain financial resources." 
Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d at 1386. 
DPW, however, has not shown that a "substantial contacts" test 
would create an undue financial burden.  DPW predicts a 
substantial contacts test would be susceptible to abuse, opening 
the door "for out-of-state parents to attempt to present sham 
residency claims on behalf of their incompetent children," and 
"encourag[ing] counties to place their residents in other 
counties' facilities, if not out-of-state facilities," and 
abandon their funding obligations by declaring them residents of 
the new county or state.  We are skeptical of these predictions. 
First, DPW has offered no evidence that the proposed modification 
would likely lead to these results.  Second, we have injected a 
threshold good faith inquiry to forestall this kind of abuse and 
these hypothesized strategies would likely fail a substantial 
contacts test that looks at duration of residence, quality of 
contacts to the new locale, and relationships to other locations. 
And finally, we require the Commonwealth to consider substantial 
contacts only when traditional residency tests discriminatorily 
exclude retarded individuals.      
18 
 As we have noted, the Juvelises have conceded that Niki 
lacks the mental capacity to choose a domicile, but his parents 
are clearly acting in good faith and in his best interests when 
they assert Niki is domiciled in Pennsylvania.  DPW has not met 
its burden of proving that it would impose an undue burden on the 
Commonwealth to consider substantial contacts to determine 
whether Niki has established domicile in Pennsylvania.0 
VII. 
 We will affirm the district court's judgment that DPW 
has failed to carry its burden of proving that it would interfere 
with the essential nature of the program or be unduly burdensome 
to allow Niki to rebut the presumption that he maintains his 
parents' domicile. 
 Nevertheless, our inquiry does not end there.  Niki 
must establish that he has in fact changed his residence from 
that of his parents.  The Juvelises have pointed to several 
                     
0DPW claims there is no presumption that the profoundly retarded 
cannot prove the requisite intent.  According to the agency, 
residency determinations are made "on a case-by-case basis," and 
the policy "says nothing whatsoever" about who can or cannot form 
the requisite intent. Indeed, as plaintiff points out, if Niki 
were capable of declaring an intent to make Pennsylvania his 
home, DPW would not accept such a declaration as determinative, 
but would consider other factors that supported or 
contradicted such a conclusion.  
 Nevertheless, DPW insists that consideration of 
substantial contacts to Pennsylvania would be unworkable.  It 
appears to us that, in practice, DPW relies exclusively on its 
presumption that a profoundly retarded individual takes the 
domicile of his parent as of the time he turned eighteen. 
 DPW also has pointed out that the Juvelises did not 
seek review of DPW's eligibility decision.  Given DPW's 
application of its presumption that profoundly retarded 
individuals cannot manifest an intent to change domicile, we 
believe a request for review would have been futile. 
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objective factors that support the conclusion that Niki has 
established a domicile in Pennsylvania:  Niki has resided at 
Melmark for eighteen years, all of his friends and possessions 
are there, his parents have paid substantial fees to the Delaware 
County home over those years, and it is expected that Niki will 
continue to reside in Pennsylvania for the rest of his life. 
Furthermore, within his limited ability to do so, Niki has 
expressed a subjective attachment to Melmark.0  Finally, his 
parents are clearly acting in good faith and in Niki's best 
interest in asserting that Melmark is Niki's home.  We conclude 
that Niki has made a sufficient showing to establish a change of 
domicile to Pennsylvania.   
VIII. 
 DPW has failed to prove that a modification of its 
policy to allow Niki to show a change of domicile to Pennsylvania 
would be unduly burdensome.  Accordingly, we hold that a mentally 
incompetent individual who has been denied state funded services 
by operation of the presumption that incompetents cannot intend a 
change of domicile may rebut that presumption.  The individual 
must demonstrate good faith and must show substantial contacts to 
Pennsylvania in order to establish that he has adopted a 
Pennsylvania domicile.  We believe the Juvelises have made the 
requisite showing and will affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
                     
0Melmark is the only home he remembers, he repeats the word 
"Melmark" when he is off the grounds, and he turns his wheelchair 
and heads towards his cottage at Melmark when told it is time to 
go home.   
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